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Abstract:　This study aims to examine methods of building disaster-resistant communities in urban waterfront areas
through identifying and analyzing risk factors and mitigating factors through the case study of the September 11th
terrorist attacks on New York City and the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11th, 2011. This paper emphasizes
that the results of constant vigilance and thorough preparation by local governments and members of the community
are effective ways to ensure and establish efficient crisis management and resiliency in the face of disaster, focusing
on the critical first 48 hours following a disaster, and detailing the most vital actions that authorities and citizens must
take during that phase.
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Introduction
Immediately after a disaster, either natural or man-made, what
first responders are eager to know is“What has happened?”, “Who
needs help?”,“Where am I needed?”, and “What is needed to
help people?”1 Although these questions are essential to an effec-
tive response, no authority or agency can readily and precisely
answer them in the initial phase of a crisis. More accurately, even
first responders sometimes do not know to whom they should
direct these questions, or, even if they know, it is not certain that
they can communicate that information to their commanders at
all.2 This uncertainty only complicates the chaotic yet critical first
48 hours after a disaster, in which most of the injured can be
treated and lives can be saved. Of course, we need to have an
emergency plan in place for such a circumstance, but it must be
borne in mind that a plan that is too detailed and complicated can-
not be implemented well in an emergency.3 Even though a plan
cannot anticipate all scenarios, we nevertheless have a duty to
prepare ourselves for these cases as best we can so that casualties
can be minimized.
There are some instances in recent memory in which confusion
in the aftermath of a disaster exacerbated its impact even though
these disasters occurred in the most developed and well-resourced
of countries.  For instance, on September 11, 2001, because there
was a lack of equipment for disaster relief and a breakdown of
infrastructure, first responders in New York City had to use their
own shirts to cover their faces while attempting to rescue
survivors4 and to buy bottled water with money from their own
pockets to treat the injured. Today, these first responders who
frantically tried to save as many people as they could are suffering
from a myriad of health problems, particularly to the lungs, such
as chronic bronchitis and even lung cancer, because of the lack of
adequate protection during their missions. Obviously, they should
be considered victims of the disaster as well. Reducing the num-
ber of collateral injuries caused to rescue workers must also be
one of the pillars of disaster management.
Another example is the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011,
in which professional and volunteer firefighters who rushed to
manually close the floodgates at the 30-minute interval between
the earthquake and the tsunami died accomplishing their mission.
Tragically, some arrived at gates which had already been closed
by others without that knowledge because of a breakdown in
communication. The death toll among those firefighters was 211.
Furthermore, survivors of the tsunami themselves died from
hypothermia because there were insufficient provisions such as
food, blankets, and medications. These deaths could all have been
avoided had there been an effective contingency plan in place.
Obviously, the first 48 hours, commonly referred to as Phase 1
to 2, is vital for disaster management. During this phase, much
assistance is required, e.g. heavy machinery, from outside of the
disaster zone for the rescue effort, so prompt and efficient logis-
tics is crucial. The point to remember is that there is no ready-
made emergency plan in existence that is clear, practical, and able
to answer the questions asked at the top of the introduction. To
minimize the number of casualties, it is crucial that we determine
beforehand who must do what, in what manner, where, and when.
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Despite the difficulty, however, this paper will aim to create
such a plan for an urban waterfront area through cooperation
between the government, the private sector, and among the resi-
dents themselves, to build a disaster-resilient community. Since
what we should do might change based on the circumstances both
before and after the disaster, we need to specify what appropriate
actions to take at what stage of our emergency plan. Therefore, it
is needed to divide our plan into five steps: Identifying Risk Fac-
tors, Assessing Mitigating Factors, Disaster Preparedness, Emer-
gency Response, and Recovery.
Dependent on the type of disaster, specific emergency
responses have to be taken, so it is imperative to identify the
potential dangers beforehand in order to respond more effectively
and to make the management of the response easier. For example,
firefighters should be able to locate sources of flammable sub-
stances in areas such as fuel tanks, gas drums, and chemical plants
so that evacuation routes can be planned to avoid these points.
Also, since the waterfront areas may be a danger in the aftermath
of an earthquake because of the possibility of a tsunami, tempo-
rary shelters should then be built well away from the coast. A
well-designed emergency plan should include some identification
of risk factors.
Simultaneously, it is necessary to indicate some mitigating fac-
tors inherent in the area of a potential disaster zone. If the wind
from the shore is generally humid at particular times, it might
dampen the strength of a fire. Also, if there is a thoroughfare
going through a ward, it might prevent the spread of the fire to
neighboring areas. Finally, if a district has high ground, it might
facilitate the residents’ evacuation in the event of a flood. Know-
ing the mitigating factors will help planners to estimate more
accurately at what level the impact of the catastrophe might possi-
bly be.
To promote preparedness for a disaster, it is essential for first
responders to be familiar with the locations of critical infrastruc-
ture buildings such as power plants, water works, communication
towers, train stations, hospitals, schools, and police and fire sta-
tions so that they can figure out how they would coordinate their
functions to search for and rescue any victims. Thus, after having
identified the clear risk factors and potential mitigating elements,
planners will be able to eliminate danger and better prepare them-
selves.
In turn, these three phases of the emergency plan should lead to
quick and smooth access to the disaster scene and efficient
response to search and rescue missions. With the knowledge from
these phases, first responders can avoid danger areas and routes
when carrying out their missions. They will have the necessary
supplies ready at the stockpile locations.
The last consideration of our disaster management plan is
recovery. Generally, recovery is examined from a long-term per-
spective, but the evacuees should get back to their ordinary lives
as soon as possible. While it is true that indispensable supplies
need to be distributed after the disaster, it would be even better if
those affected could access those materials at local stores. This
will also have the effect of returning a sense of normality, an
important psychological benefit to those who have been trauma-
tized, allowing them to gradually become self-sufficient again.
This should be considered as the very first step of a real recovery.
Through the examination of these five steps, this study will
help the community to be better ready to handle a catastrophe. We
cannot force the population to evacuate from an area in times of
disaster without their prior understanding and knowledge of the
plan. The cooperation and coordination between the government,
the private sector, and the community in all five steps is essential
for the effective execution of the plan. For instance, the private
sector often has a wide domestic, and sometimes even global,
logistics network. In contrast, small municipal authorities might
not be capable of operating fully in the case of a disaster when the
entire man power is concurrently carrying out their duties and suf-
fering as victims themselves. Thus, during recovery, the participa-
tion of the private sector will make it more efficient, especially in
restoring the supply chain. Moreover, suppliers need to know
where people should go and what is needed, so if we can antici-
pate the movement and the needs of the people, it will make the
relief effort more efficient.
This paper will examine and propose emergency management
plans for urban waterfront areas, focusing on the critical first 48
hours following a disaster, and detailing the most vital actions that
authorities and citizens must take during that phase, given that it
is the most panic-filled yet decisive stage.
I.  Disaster Preparedness
The very first step of emergency management is disaster pre-
paredness. If there is enough preparation before a disaster occurs,
it is no exaggeration to say that the most important and critical
emergency management tasks are already half completed. In other
words, at the moment of the disaster, it is too late to discuss and
determine what the authorities, first responders, and residents
should do.
This stage of preparations for potential and looming crises fac-
ing our community might be divided into three sub-stages. The
first is to identify the risk factors in the community. The second is
to assess the mitigating factors in that community. The third is to
plan, check, and take actions for effective emergency response.
These sub-stages are contained within the larger stage of general
disaster preparedness. Each sub-stage will be chronologically
depicted in this section.
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i.  Identifying Risk Factors in Communities
It is easy to imagine that firefighters do routine checkups on
households regarding simple yet relevant issues, such as the pres-
ence of vulnerable members (i.e. seniors and children), fire haz-
ards, and safety precautions. It seems to be a given, but the first
step of disaster management is an extension of this because if we
look out at the broader area, not only around the house, we can
see locations where there are hazardous materials, such as gas
drums, places where children gather, such as schools and parks,
places where there are crowds, such as hospitals, and areas where
there is heavy traffic, as risk factors.
One of the cores of disaster management is measures for mini-
mizing the death toll. In this first stage of emergency planning,
information gathering and analysis have great significance. If the
useful and correct information for verification of danger can be
collected prior to any potential disasters, and that danger can be
eliminated through adequate information analysis as a result, the
potential impact of disaster will for certain be diminished. From
this standpoint, it is sensible to extract dangerous factors from
structures such as energy plants, chemical storage facilities, fuel
transport vessels and vehicles to protect and strengthen surround-
ing infrastructure and routes that are vulnerable.
　1)  Identifying Risk Factors in Cities
It is imperative to recognize the ultimate goals in creating
emergency plans. These goals are to identify vulnerabilities in
order to reduce or, if possible, eliminate them, and to prepare to
mitigate the consequences of disasters5. In order to achieve these
goals, it is necessary to consider the elements that are composed
of the possibility of threats, the criticality of infrastructure, and
the vulnerability of people.6 In terms of these elements, there are
large numbers of check points in cities. Accordingly, for effective
disaster preparedness and response, it is important to embody
these elements into three concrete indicators based on their char-
acteristics as risk factors.
The first category of risk factors is natural conditions. They are
determined by the degree of the slope of the land, the firmness of
the ground, and the proximity to the shoreline. Fire runs fastest up
slopes, soil liquefaction can occasionally occur in reclaimed land,
and earthquakes can bring tsunamis. The second category is struc-
tural conditions.They cover some of the characteristics of the city;
narrow streets, dead ends, high density of houses and population,
and closeness to hazardous materials, such as gas stations, small
factories and vehicles. In particular, waterfront areas are the most
highly and densely developed as hubs of logistics and transporta-
tion. The third is human-related conditions. They can be analyzed
as the age of the population, the number of patients in hospitals
and small children in schools.
In a crisis, even residents knowledgeable of the local geogra-
phy can become confused by debris and fire obstructions on their
way to assembly points, such as school grounds, parks, vacant
land and parking lots. As a result, it is often more beneficial for
local residents to make mental notes of the local landscape in their
daily lives; walking and memorizing through mapping local land-
marks, verifying their knowledge of their own hometown.That is
to say that it is worthwhile walking through the main roads and
backstreets with residents who are familiar with that area to check
on those landmarks and finally to create a map with residents and
the local government.
　2)  Case Study - Omori -
A prime example of this attempt was realized in Omori, Ota-
ward in Tokyo. On July 10th and 12th, 2012, the chairman of the
neighborhood association, the head of the branch office of Ota
Ward Office, and the chief of the disaster protection management
section carried out an on-the-spot survey in Omori with a team
from the Tokyo University of  Marine Science and Technology
with the aim of creating maps. This area is designated by Tokyo
Metropolitan Government as one of the areas most vulnerable to
the potential collapse of old wooden houses, the spread of fire,
and the blockage of evacuation routes by debris from collapsed
buildings and walls in the event of an earthquake.7 Since this town
was historically constructed as a harbor area for seaweed (Nori in
Japanese) fishermen’s boats, old wooden houses are situated on
both sides of winding narrow paths, which used to be mooring
points for Nori fishermen’s boats from the sea shore to their
homes. This town is 500 meters from shore line of Keihin Canal
that connect with Tokyo Bay, and surrounded by Uchi River in
north and Nomi River in south, which are flow into Keihin
Canal.The town is from one to two meters above sea level. This
historical town is designated as one of five waterfront cities in
Ota-ward by the Ward Office.8
To minimize these risks, i.e. flood, tsunami, collapse, fire, and
blockages caused by debris, authorities recommend residents use
flame-resistant materials for new roofs, walls, floorings and
fences to prevent the accumulation of embers. Another significant
policy is to widen roads, mainly by means of so-called“setback”,
by which a householder must rebuild his/her house to the rear of
its original position in order to widen the road. However, these
methods are too heavy a burden for residents, especially for senior
citizens, in terms not only of expense but also inconvenience.9
Therefore, residents utilize grassroots networks that have been
in existence for a many years in the neighborhood as the most
effective way of transforming and improving risky neighborhoods
into ones able to withstand disaster and to cope with long-term
potential problems - in the case of Omori, death caused by col-
lapsed buildings and fire. Having struggled with these issues, the
residents in Omori have organized very well-trained volunteer
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groups of fire fighters. Also, they have developed close ties with
the local authorities, fire stations, and neighborhood associations.
Since these efforts clearly mitigate risk factors, it is appropriate to
verify these mitigating factors in the next chapter. In this section,
natural and structural risk factors in a specific neighborhood in
Omori will be examined below. The following map, Figure 1,
illustrates the location of Omori as an urban waterfront nearby
Tokyo International Airport (a. k. a.“Haneda Airport”).
　3)  Mapping Risk Factors in Omori
The most famous -- and infamous -- characteristics of Omori
are its narrow, winding streets and dead ends. Fire engines need
streets that are at least four meters wide in order to gain access.
The following map is highlighted to represent the width of the
roads in Omori. Simultaneously, as residents also need open
access to roads as fire escapes, the map also emphasizes the cor-
ners of dead ends using diagonal lines. These are structural condi-
tions that should be assessed as risk factors. In addition to these
conditions, this urban waterfront area is only a few feet above sea
level and half a mile away from shoreline.
The following map, Figure 2, shows visually the risk factors in
the community to help reduce the exact risks that can magnify the
impact of a disaster. 
ii. Assessing Mitigating Factors in Communities
In contrast to the risk factors, there are some natural or struc-
tural conditions that mitigate the effects of an incident. For
instance, the contour of an area can be helpful in an evacuation
because, in cases of tsunami, flood, and liquefaction, a higher alti-
tude will allow an escape route or a shelter to avoid the inundated
zones. Some factors are intrinsically fire-proofing, such as wind
directions, humidity, open space, which all prevent the spread of a
fire; even particular species of trees can deter a fire. In addition to
that, the proximity to the site of the fire of fire departments, hospi-
tals, and main roads, which enable first responders to reach the
site more quickly, can affect the response time.  These elements
all mitigate potential damages from an event.
In this second stage of emergency planning, mitigating factors
should be precisely calculated so as to not overlook or understate
the risks. Therefore, mitigating factors should be numerically
explained. One important question that should be examined is
how long it takes for fire engines to arrive at a particular scene
from the nearest fire station. For instance, this can be displayed
from 0 to 4: If fire engines arrive in three minutes, the value is 0,
with each subsequent interval representing three additional min-
utes. In addition to this factor, distance and capacity of nearby
hospitals, presence of main roads, density of trees, location of
open space, and recorded frequency of fire breaking of a site are
also considered.
　1)  Assessing Mitigating Factors in Cities
Particular factors may mitigate catastrophic situations caused
by natural or man-made disasters, as we have examined above.
For instance, flood gates, outer tide embankments, interior
embankments and drainage pumps are expected to function in the
case of high tides.
Still, these mitigating factors’ effects may not decrease the
severity of the crisis. For instance, the main roads that are sup-
posed to be emergency transportation networks for emergency
vehicles will be filled with the general public and their vehicles,
who are trying to evacuate from the epicenter immediately after
Fig. 1 Map of Omori, Ota-ward, Tokyo, Japan
(Source: Existing Land Use, Ota-ward, 2006,
http:/ /www.city.ota.tokyo.jp/kuseijoho/
ota_plan/kobetsu_plan/sumai_machinami/
kukorinkaibugrandvision2030.files/1sho.pdf)
Fig. 2 Road Map in Omori
(Source: ArcGIS Published Map by ESRI)
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the disaster has struck, to go home, to pick his/her family mem-
bers up, or to even get essential items, such as water, food, gaso-
line, etc. Open spaces that are designated as sheltering places may
be flooded and unable to accommodate the required number of
evacuees. Particularly gymnasiums, parks, schools, the first and
second floors of buildings, and other low-lying areas may not be
accessible in cases of high tides or tsunami. In addition to that, if
large buildings that were designated as shelters are likely to be
damaged by the disaster, they may be unusable until a structural
assessment has been carried out and they have been deemed safe
for use. Therefore, it is imperative to calculate accurately mitigat-
ing factors for effective emergency planning.
　2)  Mapping Mitigating Factors in Omori
In terms of geological conditions which are fixed, nearness to
the shore line is generally evaluated as high risk from viewpoint
of the possibility of tsunami and flood. However, Tokyo Bay
extends far inland from the Pacific Ocean, and therefore, tsunami
are not predicted to reach the Tokyo Port area. Additionally, the
height of tide embankments are 4.7 meters, sufficient to cope with
the maximum height of a tsunami predicted by Ota-ward local
government of one meter in Omori.
On the other hand, structural conditions, unlike geological con-
ditions can be handled. Fire engines cannot access narrow streets
perfectly, but fire hydrants and extended fire hoses might mitigate
this problem. The map displays the location of fire hydrants, fire
extinguishers, and the water for extinguishing fires and the dis-
tances from the four-meter-width roads are explained numerically.
The open spaces also mitigate the risk as temporary assembly
places. Since, on the occasion of an earthquake, utility poles may
be toppled, power lines may hang down on the streets, and sign-
boards and windows of buildings may fall and shatter, it is impor-
tant to congregate in open spaces as assembly points in order to
assess the situation, especially in densely crowded cities, even if
those spaces are limited in size. The open spaces are bordered by
green lines. Fortunately, there are a number of open spaces in
Omori.
The map below, Figure 3, shows how it is mitigated by particu-
lar factors; where people congregate in the event of a disaster;
which roads has four-meter width to be used as fire engines and
rescue squad approach.
ii.  Preparedness
After having verified the risk factors and mitigating factors of
the port area, it is necessary to prepare for emergencies. Before-
hand, emergency services can collect the data that will be needed
at the moment of disaster and analyze how to conduct search and
rescue missions using this gathered data. 
When the World Trade Center was attacked on September 11,
2001, the city’s Emergency Management Center was located in
the World Trade Center complex. Therefore,“all the hardware,
software, and geographic data that the city would normally use for
its own Geographic Information Systems (GIS) response to a
major disaster was destroyed.”10 Obviously, their destruction
fueled the existing confusion and chaos, thus making the response
slower and less effective. Fortunately, the city had relatively new
data sets known as NYCMap, the city’s standard cartographic
basemap. Besides that, there were various governmental depart-
ments providing a detailed description of the infrastructure and
data sets for the search and rescue operations. The New York City
Department of Design and Construction (NYCDDC), the New
York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP),
the New York City Department of Transportation (NYCDOT),
Empire City Subway (ECS), New York City Transit (NYCT), the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey, that had held information and
datasets for New York City maintained some data and maps of the
city’s infrastructure, which aided the emergency response.11
On the occasion of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the three
neighboring prefectures of the epicenter, Iwate, Fukushima, and
Miyagi were completely devastated, with the local governments
ceasing to function as their personnel were killed and buildings
destroyed. They also lost their registers on residents, so they
could not reach out to any prospective survivors or verify if any-
one was indeed missing. These two instances show that it is
important to spread crucial information across various govern-
mental agencies in different locations so that they can be actually
utilized in case of emergency.
Fig. 3 Fire Extinguisher and Open Space Map.
(Source: ArcGIS Published Map by ESRI)
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These experiences in a crisis provided valuable lessons for
emergency services. Consequently, some vital procedures have
been established in disaster management. These are worthy of
detailed note below.
　1)  The Redundancy System
The experiences mentioned above led to the creation of what
has become known as“The Redundancy System”. This has
become the common emergency management practice currently
in use. To increase its success in coping with a crisis and to mini-
mize failure in disaster management caused by loss of informa-
tion and datasets, and the death or injury of personnel in the
authorities themselves, the Redundancy System states that emer-
gency response systems ought to contain parallel or“redundant”
systems so that a fatal blow to the authorities in charge or even the
annihilation of any one agency can be covered and backed-up by
another. For instance, if the Manhattan system is incapacitated,
the same data will be held in reserve in Albany, thus ensuring
operational response. 
To secure the effectiveness of this system, comprehensive data
and information must be collected and stored in order to effec-
tively meet all potential scenarios in the future. This would
include designing redundancy into the system in several areas: the
regional transportation network, agency personnel, communica-
tions and utilities, control centers, equipment and supplies.
In situations like these, information that is critical to search and
rescue missions must be distributed to first responders promptly
so that they accomplished them efficiently. Some questions worth
keeping in mind are, “Where is the entrance or other access points
of the building?”,“Which hospitals can handle a high number of
serious injuries?”,“How are the injured transported to those
hospitals?”, and “Where will the people go? Should they evacuate
to the nearest school, park, or any other public building, or should
they stay at their own place?” If the authorities can predict the
movement of residents and plan accordingly, they can dispatch
rescue crews and dispense relief supplies more swiftly.
In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, in Miyagi
prefecture, all family registers were lost in the tsunami. Both the
local government and the Legal Affairs Bureau had records, but
they did not distribute these records as nationwide networks to
places remote from the disaster zone. As a consequence, having
data stored at separate locations was ineffective due to those loca-
tions both being destroyed simultaneously. Documents of residen-
tial domicile in this town were lost completely. Medical data in
hospitals such as MRI and CT scans and medication documents
were also lost.
All these emergency responses and decisions based on the crit-
ical information require protecting information in the any serious
crises.
　2)  The Assembly Area
“The Assembly Area” is designated as a temporary place to
gather in case of emergency and is distinguished from shelters or
command posts. In an ideal situation, the assembly areas nomi-
nated should be protected structurally from the affected areas
where there are potentially unstable buildings, and should be
available and accessible at all times while being close enough to
and yet far enough from any danger areas. They should also be
situated close enough to alternative assembly points in order to
allow people to move away from the primary assembly area to
those alternatives, if necessary. 
On the other hand, in the areas affected by the Great East Japan
Earthquake, entire towns suffered fatal damage from the tsunami,
and people were unable to assemble. Some spent the night in
extreme distress and cold in the open air. Some villagers who
were fortunate enough to be able to reach shelters heard that oth-
ers had not been so lucky and that other shelters had been
destroyed by the tsunami. Therefore, it is essential to be aware
that people will not always be able to reach functioning and intact
assembly areas in crises. Nevertheless, it is imperative that a num-
ber of well-prepared assembly areas are designated prior to disas-
ters.
　3)  Succession Plans
“Succession Plans” establish orders of succession of both per-
sonnel and facilities to alternative ones. The purpose of succes-
sion is to secure the functions of crisis management in an
emergency. Geographic dispersion of these alternatives is neces-
sary, so that emergency response can function effectively.12
In terms of personnel, there is no guarantee of being able to
meet with or communicate with emergency coordinators. In that
situation, people rely on the officers on the ground to give clear
instructions. Succession plansgive those officers the authority to
make executive decisions,so long as this authority has been previ-
ously planned for as acontingency. So, even if an emergency
worker loses contact with his/her superior, he/she will defer to a
prior-agreed substitute decision-maker, or, in the absence of one,
take on that responsibility him or herself. Succession plans should
establish clear instructions and rules so that designated personnel
can perform their duties. 
Also, alternative operating facilities are essential. Alternative
facilities and personnel must be previously designated and pre-
pared in order to perform the essential functions of disaster man-
agement. Facilities will be selected from existing infrastructure.
These facilities should be geographically“close enough, but far
enough”13 to operate in safety. To acquire such adequate facilities,
not only interagency cooperation and agreement, but also public-
private partnership and mutual aid agreement are required to pro-
vide alternative site capabilities. Alternative facilities should pro-
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vide the capability to perform essential functions under various
threat conditions, and offer sufficient space and equipment to sus-
tain operations for up to 30 days.
In Fukushima, “the Off-Site Center” was located approxi-
mately five kilometers from Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Plant.
Immediately after the earthquake, it was hit by a blackout, and
emergency power generators also ceased to function. After the
explosion of the Nuclear Plant, radiation levels increased in the
Center, since it did not have an outer air shutoff system. Agents
from 20 organizations were supposed to gather in this Center, but,
in fact, only 15 personnel from three organizations were able to.
In reality, it did not function and the Center was transferred five
days after the incident to the Fukushima prefectural office 60
kilometers away.
Also, in Ookawa Elementary School, located four kilometers
from the coast in Miyagi, North-East Japan, the Principal was not
at school on March 11th, 2011, the day of the disaster. After the
earthquake, students stayed for 40 minutes in the school yard
while the vice-principal and teachers discussed where they should
evacuate to. When a decision was finally made, pupils started to
walk along a river to a bridge, and were engulfed by the incoming
tsunami. 74 pupils out of 104 died. Because the vice-principal
was not designated decision-maker and succession planning
guidelines, he was ill-equipped to make informed executive deci-
sions. Even if the Principal had been there, there would have been
no guarantee of swift and appropriate action. Nevertheless, this
most tragic event in Japanese history laid this school open to criti-
cism because of a lack of succession planning and leadership. 
　4)  Logistics
“Logistics” plays a vital role in saving lives. However in times
of crises, logistics may be hampered by choke points. Highways,
national roads, and streets may be damaged or blocked. There-
fore, a key element in emergency supply to the epicenter of disas-
ter areas could be the reopening of those roads.
However, when the disaster damage is more serious, logistics is
crucial, especially, in order to rescue the sick and wounded from
isolated areas. In the case of Great East Japan Earthquake, this
meant intensive efforts to reopen a single road to the stricken area
from outside by the removal of debris and the repair of the road
surface. The elimination of road obstacles (so-called“Keikai” in
Japanese) was the very first mission of the emergency services
after the disaster. This was known as“Operation Kushinoha”
(teeth of a comb), which managed to reopen National Road Num-
ber 4, enabling access to eleven feeder roads which could then
reach damaged coastal areas, rather like the teeth of a comb,
emerging from the main artery. Within three days of the disaster,
15 roads were reopened on 15th March.
On the other hand, one of the most serious problems after the
Great East Japan Earthquake was lack of and loss of emergency
provisions. Food and Blankets were damaged or destroyed by the
tsunami and survivors suffered hunger, thirst, and cold. Therefore,
the main priority in a disaster is sufficient stockpiles of food,
water, and blankets. In addition to that, since concentration of
reserves in one location -- in the case of the Great East Japan
Earthquake, at an elementary school -- did not significantly help
evacuees due to damage to emergency provisions, dispersion of
reserves is now regarded as preferable in order to hedge the risk.
The unavailability of emergency supplies is now regarded as a
fatal factor in exacerbating the situation after the Great East Japan
Earthquake.
These phenomena concerning logistics might be mitigated by
more thorough preparedness, such as earthquake-resistant piers
and roads; cooperation agreements between the local govern-
ments and the construction companies to respond more swiftly to
emergency situations; and larger reserves of emergency essentials
more broadly dispersed.
　5)  Traffic Control
The most important task in disaster management by the police
department is traffic control. Immediately after disasters, people
try to get home, either by vehicle or on foot. The main roads are
filled with people and vehicles － the so-called“stranded
commuters.” 
Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department has released a map
detailing potential traffic controls in the case of emergency on its
website14. According to these regulations, the area within Ring
Road Number 7 will be designated a no-entry zone while within
Ring Road Number 8 will be a limited access area. Seven routes:
National Highways; Metropolitan Express Ways; National Routes
4, 17, 29, 246; and Tokyo Metropolitan roads, will be used only
for emergency vehicles and entry will be prohibited for general
traffic. Moreover, if more serious damage were to occur in the
center of Tokyo, the Department may regulate still more.
New York City is also located in a port area and is composed of
islands. The greatest concern of the New York City Police Depart-
ment is how they might process evacuations from these islands to
the safer mainland. The lesson learned from the September 11th
terrorist attacks -- in which a supposedly disaster-proof building
collapsed － is“Never Say Never.”15  Therefore, preparedness for
saving lives in New York City is comprehensive. Questions and
answers are clear: If the Brooklyn Bridge is structurally damaged
and cannot be used to evacuate; if the tunnels are flooded; if a
four-lane road is the only route to the stricken area; there are no
scenarios left to chance and up to 50 landing craft are available
for evacuation. Simultaneously, the authorities will secure one
lane of a road to the disaster area in order to dispatch emergency
services and equipment to the stricken zone while three lanes will
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be open to the public for evacuation from the epicenter.
　6)  Templates for Preparedness
At the conclusion of emergency preparedness, in order to con-
tain the disaster, in the best possible manner, we would like to
propose a set of templates for each and every first response orga-
nization, be it law enforcement or any other organization that will
take part in this gigantic effort. In order to simplify the retention
of the suggested steps, the presentation is in the form of bullet
points that exemplify the steps that need to be taken by the first
response personnel as following templates Fig. 4-1 to 4-4. These
templates are predicated upon the assumption that each organiza-
tion that has to be part of the emergency response will have to cre-
ate a set of emergency plans that should be customized based on
the more specific nature and availability of resources of the given
organization.
As noted above, in any emergency plan there are always inher-
ent problems to which suggested solutions are presented which,
again, should be customized based on the role of the given
agency. However that may be, it is worthwhile to examine the
emergency plans by checking item by item in these templates.
II.  Emergency Response
In this stage of emergency planning, what kind of data helps
first responders? The answer is totally different from the three
stages of preparedness depicted above, i.e. identifying risk fac-
tors, identifying mitigating factors, and preparation. For those
three stages, the data and information was examined in minute
detail and a number of detailed maps were created by emergency
services to aid prompt response.
In contrast, for emergency response, the commands should be
clear and simple because in the chaos and confusion of a disaster,
dispatched emergency crews may not necessarily be familiar with
the zone to which they have been deployed. Therefore, templates
for emergency response must be clear and manuals simple. Com-
plicated maps and commands will not help first responders and
may even cause confusion for them. To show the location of com-
mand posts, evacuation routes, bridges, tunnels, and building
access points are sufficient. These next two sections aim to make
clear what should be done in order to help emergency services. 
EMERGENCY PLANS
Each employees must review the 
emergency plan 
Employees must be encouraged to 
give their input about the plan
Review the emergency plan with 
other agencies that experienced 
similar events and/or are preparing 
similar emergency plans
Problems with Emergency Plans:
Emergency plans become dated quickly
Employees retire, resign, are reassigned
Availability of the equipment and 
command center and other work sites 
can change
Emergency plans do not always provide 
an adequate and/or relevant solution –
re: magnitude of the specific type of 
disaster
Fig. 4-1  Template for Preparedness
Fig. 4-2  Template for Preparedness
SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
Someone in a ranking position is 
designated as the CRISIS 
COORDINATOR who will:
Review the emergency plan on a regular 
basis (At least every 6 months)
Be aware of all personnel movements
Visit all locations mentioned in the plan
Be aware of major equipment purchases
SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
Responsibility linked to a position rather 
than an individual
Place the emergency plan into the 
agency’s computer network – for access 
of all the employees
Mutual- aid agreements – joint 
Command Center
Continue to develop leadership 
capabilities within each organization 
Fig. 4-3  Template for Preparedness
Fig. 4-4  Template for Preparedness
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i.  Phases of Emergency Response
It is more helpful to divide this emergency response stage into
3 phases because needs will change as the situation evolves. From
the exact moment to within hours of the disaster, the period
should be called Phase 0, in which search and rescue mission
might only be done by whatever tools, however primitive, ineffi-
cient, or inefficient they might be, that are available, or even by
hand; this is the so-called “light rescue”. There is no reliable sup-
ply of running water or electricity. Since survivors are starting to
take refuge from the point of origin, traffic congestions will be
common, which will obstruct the mobility of rescue vehicles.
The next stage, Phase 1, is covers the 24 hours after the event,
which is also the most chaotic time. The number of severely
injured will surge and will need to be treated at the hospitals. As
the logistics network is destroyed, supplies will run short. Survi-
vors start to hoard the remaining supplies, such as bottled water,
canned food, flash lights, and so on, which will incite social
unrest. All these will make the rescue and relief effort much more
difficult.
Lastly, the period from 24 to 48 hours after the disaster is cate-
gorized as Phase 2. External assistance will start to reach the area.
Heavy rescue, with the appropriate equipment and the experi-
enced staff, commences, but coordination will still not be suffi-
cient because clear will not be established yet.  The scene is still
confusing and disorderly.
Throughout the three phases, control of the disaster area is both
critical and the most difficult thing to achieve. What are the obsta-
cles to the coordinated management of the crisis? Chains of com-
mand exist in specific sections of police and fire departments.
However, communication channels between different governmen-
tal organizations may not be smooth, which may hamper inter-
organizational cooperation. In fact, the Fire Department of New
York City (FDNY) was unable to communicate with the New
York City Police Department (NYPD) on September 11th, 2001
due to radio frequency differences. Additionally, the fire fighters
could not contact their command post from inside the World
Trade Center because of limited radio availability. Now, these
flaws have been rectified through the concerted efforts of a plural-
ity of emergency services for the coordination of C4s: command,
control, communication, and coordination.16
In addition to the fundamental elements of C4s in crises, some
more concrete on-the-spot actions determine the fate of a nation
and its people when struck by disaster or catastrophe. These
actions are, for example, the modus operandi of evacuation, resto-
ration, and logistics.
ii.  Evacuation, Restoration, and Logistics
1)  Evacuation
It is not possible to evacuate everyone immediately after a
disaster. Accordingly, four methods of evacuation must be phased
in.
At the outset, a limited number of those who are in the most
dangerous and critically affected zones should be rescued. This is
the first method of evacuation:“partial evacuation.” The second
method is“building evacuation.” Even if high rise buildings are
earthquake- and flood-resistant, residents on lower floors may
need to be rescued. Thirdly:“full evacuation.” When the damage
extends far and wide, authorities choose this type of evacuation.
The Japanese government designated Iitate village in Fukushima,
which is located within 20 kilometers of the Fukushima Dai-ichi
Nuclear Plant, for full evacuation, to be achieved within a month.
The fourth method is“sheltering.” As mentioned in the previous
section, sheltering spaces cannot be relied upondue to possible
limitations in available space. It is a particularly difficult task to
nominate places of shelter. For instance, a gymnasium in Miyagi
prefecture was situated around one kilometer from the shoreline
and eight meters above sea level, and was therefore designated as
a safe shelter. Yet, one hour after the earthquake, a three-meter-
high tsunami engulfed it killing 13 people.
In addition to these logistical problems, there are human factors
to consider. In times of crisis, people do not necessarily obey the
orders of authorities. For emergency workers, it may be difficult
to persuade residents to leave their family homes and evacuate at
short notice. Pet owners, for example, may be reluctant to aban-
don missing dogs or cats. The elderly may be disorientated and
unwilling to leave familiar surroundings even in times of crisis.
So,housing and food may also be needed to accommodate pets
within shelters. Also, practical information by the emergency ser-
vices given to residents to inform them of procedures in times of
disaster is helpful from the view point of constantly keeping resi-
dents alert to the dangers of not complying with emergency orders
to evacuate.17
　2)  Restoration of Infrastructure
The restoration of infrastructure is a pressing need in crisis:
roads, railways, highways, high-rise buildings, residences, etc.
Unstable buildings may easily kill people by collapsing. Surveys
and emergency restorations can only be done by general construc-
tion companies who have the capacity to dispatch specialists and
equipment.
Immediately after the March 11th earthquake occurred, a gen-
eral construction company started taking measures to control the
situation. At 23:30 on 11th March, on the very day of the Great
East Japan Earthquake, the first truck carrying construction mate-
rials and relief supplies departed from its Niigata office to the epi-
center in Miyagi. Following that, more than 400 trucks rushed
back and forth carrying the machinery and materials needed in the
stricken zone from the Headquarters in Tokyo and the Niigata
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office. This included 16,000 meals, 170 temporary lavatories and
daily necessities.
Simultaneously, for general construction companies, it is
imperative in a crisis to secure the infrastructure. On 12th March,
10 civil engineers, led and commanded by their senior managing
officer, were dispatched to the stricken zone to survey structures.
They used National Road Number 4, an artery reopened by Kei-
kai, to reach Niigata, and then finally arrived at the damaged
coastal area, Sendai, in the morning of the 13th March through
feeder roads (“Kushinoha”, teeth of a comb), which emerged from
National Road Number 4. Their first missions were to identify no-
entry areas, conduct surveys and take temporary measures to sup-
port and strengthen damaged buildings in order to reduce the risk
of death and injury through collapse.18 Until the end of March, a
total of 300 technical experts were deployed by this contractor.
　3)   Logistics
Reconstruction of transportation networks are also at the heart
of logistics. Traffic had been cut off at many places along the
highway, and a lack of gasoline, vehicles, and personnel were
extremely serious problems. 
In addition to this bottleneck in the transport system, the pro-
ductive capacity of essentials, sorting items according to destina-
tions, and the arrangement of goods in such a way as to easily
send them to victims in shelters, also posed major logistical prob-
lems. In crisis management, the physical distribution system must
be totally coordinated from the source of supply to the ultimate
goals, i.e. the victims as end-users.
The earthquake and tsunami caused extensive damage over a
wide area in Japan. Power failures brought about shutdowns or
cutbacks in the operations of factories throughout the country.
Even emergency transportation vehicles were caught in long tail-
backs to obtain gasoline in the immediate aftermath of the event.
Huge amounts of relief supplies from all over Japan were stock-
piled in warehouses awaiting delivery because of a shortage of
personnel to sort and deliver the supplies to victims. As result of
this delay, a private logistics company offered inventory manage-
ment and delivery in order to relieve the confusion.
Emergency planning should be regionally focused. Simulta-
neously, every jurisdiction should plan for MCIs and disasters.
All plans must be simple and based on normal daily operations of
the various components involved in the disaster plan. It should be
exercised frequently, even if only by table top exercises. Emer-
gency plans for mutual assistance among government, private
sector, and community response also must be considered and
reviewed.We can contain the impact of the disaster.
III.  Recovery
Full recovery generally takes a long time, often months, or
even years. On the other hand, it is vital to begin that process of
recovery as early as possible. This chapter examines some plans
for recovery in the first 48 hours after a disaster.  
In this last stage of emergency planning, logistics is the corner-
stone for relieving the situation. Two aspects of logistics function
in offering encouragement to evacuees. One is that relief supplies
themselves undoubtedly save lives. Another is business continuity
plans that enable people to return to their daily lives: this means
not only distributing relief items but also by stocking shops and
super markets with the essentials people need. 
Nonetheless, it generally takes at least 48 hours for that logisti-
cal process to start working and for supplies to be distributed.
After this, on the third day, supply chains should be fixed and
shelters managed by residents, authorities, and volunteer groups,
and people should have gradually recover their equilibrium. On
the other hand, evacuees may start complaining about the mea-
sures devised to deal with the situation, especially those measures
relating to the distribution of relief supplies, food, and shelter. 
Consequently, it depends on sufficient preparedness as to how
fast people can recover from catastrophe and return to ordinary
life. After the Great East Japan Earthquake, the authorities recom-
mended that people stockpile necessary items for three days to
one week in their homes in order for them to stay at home in the
event of a disaster, thus lightening pressure on limited shelter
space. This policy is being adopted, especially by residents of
high-rise buildings who cannot easily go up and down without
elevators. When people do not have to wait for external assis-
tance, a great degree of confusion and anxiety may be prevented.
Conclusion
On the night of March 29th, 2012, New York City and the east-
ern seaboard of the United States were inundated by flood water
caused by Hurricane Sandy, claiming at least 90 lives in eight
states. New York City had experienced a similar crisis in 2011
when Tropical Storm Irene hit the city, and was assumed to be
well-prepared for a similar eventuality. At that time, the subway
system had been shut down beforehand with priority given to the
safety of staff and passengers. Also, a warning about Irene was
repeatedly broadcasted from the Office of Mayor Michael R.
Bloomberg, strongly recommending New Yorkers to stock upon
canned food, bottled water, batteries, and flash lights, and to avoid
using elevators, to stay inside, and to keep away from windows.
However,in the case of Sandy, the unexpected severity of the
storm created more critical problems, and authorities have had to
reevaluate the safety mechanisms in place to protect a metropolis
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only a few feet above sea level. They are now preoccupied with
constructing the most effective protection against flooding. Some
scientists assert that storm surge barriers and huge sea gates are
the most effective defense against future inundation. But some
experts contend that critical infrastructures such as the subway
system and the electricity grid, administered by the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA) and Consolidated Edison Com-
pany (ConEdison), should be made more resilient to disaster.19
This argument corresponds to that made in Japan after March
11th, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake, which also experi-
enced the collapse of embankments (so-called“super-
embankments”) along areas of coastline affected by the tsunami,
which accompanied the earthquake. As we examined above, there
are many dots that need to be joined to develop an emergency
plan for urban waterfront areas, i. e. risk factors, mitigating fac-
tors, preparedness, response, and recovery. If the emergency plans
for urban waterfront areas are too narrowly focused on specific
situations, such as water-related damages caused by floods, tsu-
nami, and surge, this might aggravate the impact of disaster. For
example, in Queens, firefighters prepared for and predicted a
flood but what they got was a fire. The most serious damage in
Queens, where 111 houses were gutted as a result of fires,was
caused by sparks from power lines not from the predicted dangers
of flood water.20
It is, therefore,essential to envisage in minute detail all possible
scenarios, risk factors and mitigating factors in order to devise
clear and simple plans that can be performed at the critical scene
within 48 hours of the disaster, which is the most panic-filled yet
decisive stage for containing the impact of the catastrophe.
Finally, we would be remiss if we had not mentioned that hav-
ing an emergency plan or plans is going to be sufficient without a
thorough exercise plan. People can only retain that much knowl-
edge without a periodical repetition and reminders.For this reason
we suggest the incorporation of, both, table-top and full field
training exercises, that can be costly but when people’s lives are at
stake no price is too high to pay. 
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都市沿岸域における緊急事態対応計画
― 発災後 48時間の危機管理 ―
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要旨：　本研究は、2001 年の米国同時多発テロ及び 2011 年の東日本大震災を素材とするケース・スタ
ディーを通じて、沿岸域に位置する市街地のリスク・ファクター及び減災ファクターを把握・分析し、災
害抵抗力あるコミュニティづくりの方法を検討する。本研究では、自治体及び地域住民による準備が、危
機管理及び災害に強い都市づくりにおいて有効な方法であることを、発災後４８時間に行政及び市民が取
るべき対応に着目して検討する。
（本研究は、社団法人日本港湾協会の港湾関係助成研究として実施された。）
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